Security Architecture

ProGit Marketplace uses the Hinge supply chain verification system from Janus, adapted for plugin distribution.

The Problem with Traditional Package Managers

❌ Typical Install Flow

# You see this
npm install express

# But the computer sees this
curl https://registry.npmjs.org/express/-/express-4.18.2.tgz \
  | npm install --legacy-peer-deps
  • ⚠️ No signature verification
  • ⚠️ No publisher identity check
  • ⚠️ Registry can serve anything
  • ⚠️ Supply chain attacks are trivial

✓ Hinge-Verified Flow

# You see this
prog plugin install syntax-highlight

# ProGit verifies:
# 1. Signature from trusted key
# 2. BLAKE3 checksum matches
# 3. Capability declarations honored
  • ✓ Dilithium3 signatures
  • ✓ Publisher KeyID verification
  • ✓ Content integrity guaranteed
  • ✓ Trust is explicit, not assumed

Core Concepts

🔑 KeyID

A publisher's identity is a content-addressed KeyID: the first 16 hex characters of blake3(public_key).

This means a key's identity is derived from its content, not assigned by a central authority.

✍️ Dilithium3 Signatures

Post-quantum digital signatures using the CRYSTALS-Dilithium3 algorithm. Future-proof against quantum computers.

Currently using test implementation. Real Dilithium3 via PQClean in production.

🔗 Content Integrity

Every artifact is referenced by its BLAKE3 hash. If the bytes change, the hash changes. If the hash matches, the bytes are identical.

🎯 Capability Scoping

Plugins declare what they need: network access to specific hosts, filesystem access level, environment variables.

Capability enforcement is enforced at runtime by the plugin engine.

Verification Flow

1

User Clicks Deeplink

progit://install/syntax-highlight

Or runs: prog plugin install syntax-highlight

↓
2

Fetch Manifest

Download manifest.json and manifest.sig from registry

↓
3

Verify Signature

Using publisher's public key from keyring

blake3(manifest_json) == dilithium3_verify(pubkey, signature)
↓
4

Check KeyID Trust

Is a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8 in your trusted keyring?

~/.progit/keyring/keyring.json
↓
5

Download & Verify Artifact

Fetch artifact, compute BLAKE3, compare to manifest

blake3(artifact) == manifest.artifact.checksum
↓
6

Install

Plugin installed with verified integrity and declared capabilities

Trust Policies

ProGit supports multiple trust policies for different security postures:

Strict

Requires one valid signature from a trusted key.

hinge verify pkg.jpk --mode strict

Best for: Individual developers

Consensus

Requires N of M valid signatures from trusted keys.

hinge verify pkg.jpk --mode consensus --threshold 2/3

Best for: Organizations, high-security environments

Deeplinks: UX, Not Security

Important: Deeplinks like progit://install/plugin are user experience shortcuts, not security mechanisms.

⚠️ What deeplinks are NOT:

  • Not cryptographic proofs
  • Not integrity guarantees
  • Not tamper-evident
  • Not revocation channels

✓ What deeplinks ARE:

  • Convenient install triggers
  • Pointers to manifests
  • URL-encoded plugin names
  • The same as typing prog plugin install X

The security happens after the deeplink triggers the install: when ProGit fetches the manifest and runs Hinge verification.

CLI Reference

Trust Management

# Add a trusted publisher key
prog trust add https://registry.progit.dev/keys/core-team.pub

# List trusted keys
prog trust list

# Remove a trusted key
prog trust remove a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8

Plugin Verification

# Verify an installed plugin
prog plugin verify syntax-highlight

# Install with verification
prog plugin install syntax-highlight